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The Badr Organization 
Iran’s Most Important Instrument in Iraq 
Guido Steinberg 
Since 2014, the Shiite Badr Organization, led by its Secretary General Hadi al-Amiri, has 
become one of the main actors in Iraqi politics. This development was largely possible 
due to the successes of its paramilitary units in the fight against the Islamic State (IS). 
The Badr Organization, which relies strongly on support from Tehran, has thus become 
the most important instrument of Iranian politics in its neighbouring country. Tehran’s 
aim is to exert as much influence as possible on the central government in Baghdad 
and, at the same time, build a strong militia that depends on it. Since Badr established 
control over the province of Diyala and the Interior Ministry of Baghdad, the organi-
zation has grown appreciably and is now playing a role similar to that of Hezbollah 
in Lebanon. Badr is also part of a growing “Shiite International” which supports the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and aggravates religious conflicts between Sunnites 
and Shiites through its violent acts. The combination of these factors makes the orga-
nization an increasingly important obstacle to the future stabilization of Iraq. 
 
The Badr Organization’s militia is playing 
an important role in fighting around the 
Iraqi city of Mosul. As the dominant part 
of the People’s Mobilization Forces (PMF), it 
has taken on the task of cutting the lines 
connecting Islamic State (IS) in Iraq with its 
bases in Syria. Originally, it had wanted to 
participate in the attack on Mosul, but the 
US government made its military support 
to Iraq dependent on Shiite militias being 
banned from the city. Although Baghdad 
has followed this wish, it is not yet guaran-
teed that PMF units will remain under their 
control now that Mosul has been liberated. 
Until July 2017, however, they limited 
themselves to operating west of Mosul and 
fighting IS in the city of Tal Afar. 
From Badr Corps to 
Badr Organization 
The Badr Organization is the oldest Shiite 
militia in Iraq and has maintained the 
closest ties to Iran. The unit was founded as 
the Badr Corps in 1983/84, the armed wing 
of the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). It was an organi-
zation made up of Iraqi exiles who fled to 
Iran when the regime of Saddam Hussein 
intensified its persecution of Shiites in 
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1979. The leader of the Corps was the cleric 
Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (1939–2003) 
whose family still dominates the Supreme 
Council today. 
From the very start, the Badr Corps was a 
subunit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami 
or Army of the Guardians of the Islamic 
Revolution), Iran’s political army. This army, 
which exists in parallel with conventional 
forces, is responsible for protecting and 
spreading the Islamic Revolution. The Iraqis 
are assigned to the Quds (= Jerusalem) Bri-
gades of the Revolutionary Guards who are 
responsible for political, military and intel-
ligence relations with Iran’s Muslim neigh-
bours in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. 
The Quds Brigades maintain contact with 
all the pro-Iranian militant groups operat-
ing in these countries, such as the Lebanese 
Hezbollah and Badr. 
The Badr Corps continued to exist after 
the Iran-Iraq War and remained part of the 
Revolutionary Guards. In the wake of the 
American invasion of 2003, Badr troops also 
marched into Iraq. The Badr Corps, which 
from then on called itself the Badr Organi-
zation, retained its paramilitary units, but 
also claimed a place in Baghdad politics 
and cooperated pragmatically with occu-
pation forces. At the same time, it retained 
close ties to Iran. Initially, the Badr Organi-
zation stood in the shadow of its (political) 
parent organization. The Supreme Council 
was Iran’s most important partner in Bagh-
dad politics for several years and Badr poli-
ticians generally represented the Supreme 
Council. Although it moved into politics, 
there are indications that the Badr Organi-
zation, at least indirectly, fought against 
US troops. In 2007, the (former) Badr com-
mander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis founded 
the Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah battalions) 
which opposed the Americans militarily 
with Iranian support. Muhandis claimed 
he left Badr in 2003, but there has been no 
evidence of disagreement or even conflict. 
Rather, Kata’ib Hezbollah maintains closer 
ties with Badr than any other militia. Its 
strong connection to the Revolutionary 
Guards and its religious-political allegiance 
to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei also 
suggest that a break never occurred. 
The founding of Kata’ib Hezbollah was 
instead part of a dual strategy that Iran 
pursues in Iraq to this day. Firstly, Tehran 
supported its Iraqi allies, the Supreme 
Council and Badr, politically and helped 
them to obtain and maintain durable 
positions of power, also by cooperating 
with the US. Secondly, it promoted the 
establishment of new militias which fought 
against US troops in order to force them 
to withdraw. A major change took place in 
May 2007, when the Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq was renamed 
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) 
whilst, at the same time, distancing itself 
from Iran. This development gave the Badr 
Organization the opportunity to establish 
itself as Iran’s most important ally in Iraq. 
In 2009, it officially parted from the Su-
preme Council and joined the (rival) State 
of Law Coalition formed by the then Prime 
Minister, Nuri al-Maliki. Badr leader Hadi 
al-Amiri was rewarded with the post of 
Minister of Transport in December 2010 
and Badr won 22 out of 328 seats in the 
2014 elections. However, the organization 
only made its breakthrough in Iraqi politics 
in 2014 when Shiite militias, led by Badr, 
took up the fight against IS. Badr and 
Kata’ib Hezbollah were now working hand 
in hand and assumed leadership of the PMF, 
founded in the same year. 
The Badr Organization 
Ideology and objectives 
The Badr Organization is a Shiite Islamist 
group, that adheres to the ideology of Aya-
tollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989) and, 
therefore, to the state ideology of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The objective of this doc-
trine, also known as the ‘rule of the reli-
gious jurist’ (Arabic: wilayat al-faqih), is 
to establish an Islamic state which, in the 
absence of the twelfth Imam al-Mahdi, is 
ruled by a religious scholar. After the Islamic 
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Revolution in 1979, Khomeini himself ini-
tially held the position of what Iranians 
named “Supreme Leader”, followed by Ali 
Khamenei in 1989. 
For the Badr Organization and its mem-
bers, the Iranian Supreme Leader is the 
highest religious and political authority, 
as Hadi al-Amiri has repeatedly confirmed. 
Indeed, Amiri presents himself as a Shiite 
internationalist for whom the cohesion 
of the Shiite Muslim community under 
Iranian leadership is more important than 
the integrity of the Iraqi national state. In 
the event of a conflict, therefore, it can be 
assumed that Amiri and the Badr Organiza-
tion would follow Khamenei’s instructions 
rather than those of the Iraqi Prime Minister. 
The close alliance of the Badr Organiza-
tion with Khamenei and the Revolutionary 
Guards has never been without its prob-
lems. Many Iraqis, including Shias, are 
critical of these ties to the Iranian leader-
ship. As a result of this criticism, the Iraqi 
Islamic Supreme Council has, at least pub-
licly, played down its relationship with 
Iran, a step that Badr never took. Badr has, 
however, tried to emphasize its Iraqi char-
acter. Indeed, it named its military wing 
after the scholar and intellectual Muham-
mad Baqir al-Sadr (1935–1980). In the late 
1950s, Sadr was one of the founders and 
leaders of the Daawa Party, currently the 
oldest and most important Shiite political 
organization in Iraq. Sadr himself never 
adopted Khomeini’s teachings of the ‘rule 
of the religious jurist’. Therefore, the fact 
that the Iran-supporting Badr Organization 
prominently acts on Sadr’s authority, re-
flects its efforts to obtain an Iraqi face. 
Accordingly, there are no indications of 
any disagreements or conflicts between the 
Iraqi organization and Khamenei’s power 
apparatus. As a result, Badr should be con-
sidered an instrument of Iranian politics in 
Iraq. The Quds Brigades of the Revolution-
ary Guards, under the command of Major 
General Qasem Soleimani, are primarily 
responsible for its practical implementa-
tion. They are solely under the command 
of the Supreme Leader, not the Iranian gov-
ernment. Since Badr has become Iran’s 
closest ally in Iraq, it is also the most im-
portant exponent of the Iranian project to 
establish an (Islamic) state within a state, 
modelled on Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is 
predestined for such a function since it con-
trols parts of Diyala and Salah al-Din prov-
inces. It also plays a role in Tehran’s efforts 
of exercising as much political influence as 
possible in Baghdad. Due to its role in the 
fight against IS, the organization and its 
leader currently enjoy a great degree of popu-
larity and, as a direct consequence, wield 
influence in the Iraqi government. In addi-
tion to Badr, the Iranian leadership has 
built other alliances with Baghdad, in par-
ticular with the Supreme Council. 
Badr’s objectives are no longer limited 
exclusively to Iraq. It sent militias to Syria 
because, together with the Revolutionary 
Guards, the organization is keen to see the 
Assad regime, an ally of the Islamic Repub-
lic and an important supporter of the Leba-
nese Hezbollah, remain in power in Syria. 
Leadership and power base 
The Badr Organization is led by Hadi 
al-Amiri who serves as Secretary General. 
Amiri, born in 1954, took part in the war 
against Iraq on the Iranian side and was 
appointed military commander of the Badr 
Corps in the 1990s. Between 2003 and 2010, 
he became a well-known figure in Iraqi 
politics and assumed political leadership of 
the group after it was renamed Badr Organi-
zation (also in 2003). However, until 2009, 
when Badr was generally considered part of 
the Supreme Council, Amiri remained some-
what in the shadows. This only changed 
after it separated from its parent organiza-
tion and formed an alliance with Prime 
Minister Maliki. Amiri and his supporters 
used his position as Transport Minister 
(which he held until September 2014) and 
the ministry’s budget to strengthen their 
own organization. 
The founding of the PMF in June 2014 
marked a turning point in Amiri’s career. 
He gave up his ministerial office and be-
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came the military leader of Badr again. At 
the same time, Amiri assumed command 
of the PMF, together with Abu Mahdi 
al-Muhandis of the Kata’ib Hezbollah and 
Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the 
Quds Brigades. Badr was additionally 
strengthened as Maliki, just before he was 
forced to give up his office in September 
2014, made Amiri the unofficial military 
governor of the province of Diyala, north-
east of Baghdad. As a result, Amiri had 
supreme command over the army and all 
the security forces in the province which, 
from February 2015, was almost completely 
controlled by Badr. In May 2015, Badr politi-
cian Muthanna al-Tamimi became the gover-
nor of Diyala, although Shiites constituted, 
at least until recently, the region’s minor-
ity. In the provinces of Diyala and Salah 
al-Din, Badr used this method to create a 
territorial basis. This distinguishes Badr 
from all other Shiite militia in Iraq and 
will, if the situation continues, make the 
organization a particularly important 
player in the long term. 
The Badr Organization’s second power 
base is the Iraqi Interior Ministry. When 
Amiri left the Ministry of Transport in Sep-
tember 2014, he was able to appoint Badr 
official Muhammad al-Ghabban as Interior 
Minister. Amiri would have assumed office 
but, according to the Badr Organization, the 
US government prevented him from doing 
so. Nevertheless, the Badr leader is con-
sidered the real strong man in the Interior 
Ministry. The importance of controlling the 
Interior Ministry had already been demon-
strated in 2005. At that time, Badr official 
Bayan Jabr al-Saulagh (still a representative 
of the Supreme Council at the time) became 
Interior Minister. He immediately ensured 
that Badr officials took control of the police 
and security services and that thousands of 
militia officers were hired. In the ensuing 
civil war (2006–2007), the ministry’s secu-
rity forces operated with Shiite militia and 
committed numerous crimes against pris-
oners and the Sunni civilian population. 
While Saulagh lost his position in 2006, 
Badr’s staff remained well represented in 
the ministry and its subordinate authori-
ties. This is the main reason for the cata-
strophic reputation of the Iraqi police 
forces in the Sunni areas of the country. For 
Badr, the ministry remained an important 
power base on which the organization would 
continue to build from 2014 onwards. In 
July 2016, following a devastating attack in 
Baghdad, Interior Minister Ghabban had to 
resign and, in January 2017, was replaced 
by Badr official Qasim al-Araji. 
The military wing 
The Badr Organization has had a separate 
military wing since 2003 called the Forces 
of the martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr 
or Martyr Sadr Forces for short (Quwwat 
al-Shahid al-Sadr). 
Even in the 1980s, the number of fight-
ers in the Badr combat units was usually 
claimed to be more than 10,000 men. After 
2003, many authors have repeated this 
figure which must be a rough estimate. In-
deed, after moving to the police and other 
security services, foreign observers were no 
longer able to clearly identify thousands of 
Badr fighters. In addition, the Badr Organi-
zation maintains paramilitary units inde-
pendent of the state authorities. This be-
came clear in 2013 when the organization 
was able to set up strong units in Syria and 
– a year later – the PMF was established in 
Iraq. In 2014, the Badr Organization claimed 
to count more than 10,000 armed men in its 
ranks. Their number is likely to have risen 
since then as the militia recruited thou-
sands of young men for the fight against IS, 
and it was able to further strengthen itself 
while securing its control over the Interior 
Ministry. Independent sources now esti-
mate their number at 20,000 men, but the 
organization claims to have reached ap-
proximately 50,000 members. Both figures 
could be correct if one distinguishes be-
tween the necessarily smaller number of 
fighters (and thus the members of the mili-
tary wing) and the higher number of other 
personnel (the political movement/party) or 
auxiliary forces that can also be mobilized 
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rapidly. Paramilitaries in the Badr Organi-
zation continue to be closely linked to Iran. 
Some of their fighters are still trained at 
the Revolutionary Guard camps in Iran, 
whose trainers are often members of the 
Lebanese Hezbollah. Since 2014, the Badr 
units are more likely to train in Iraq 
because they have experienced a strong 
influx of recruits and have built up their 
own infrastructure. Overall, due to support 
from the Revolutionary Guards and the 
Iraqi government, which has been trying 
to expand its influence over the PMF militia 
since 2014, the military wing of Badr is well 
trained and equipped. Its fighters usually 
appear in uniforms and their arms are 
mostly more modern than those of other 
militias. The Badr militia possesses many 
heavy weapons, armoured troop carriers 
and tanks. Particularly prominent are the 
IRAMs (Improvised Rocket-Assisted Mortars) 
which the civilian population fears for their 
lack of accuracy. 
With the PMF in Iraq 
The Badr Organization owes its rise to the 
People’s Mobilization Force militia alliance 
(Arabic: al-Hashd al-Sha’bi), in which it rep-
resents the dominant force. This alliance 
was formed in the summer of 2014 in re-
sponse to the IS offensive in Iraq. The initial 
triumphs of the jihadists demonstrated that 
the Iraqi army could not fight them alone 
and was in dire need of reinforcement. 
Prime Minister Maliki, a Badr ally, took 
the initiative. Only one day after IS con-
quered Mosul on 10 June, he called for a 
‘reserve army’ to be mobilized. Two days 
later, Shiite scholar Ayatollah Ali Sistani 
issued a fatwa calling for a ‘holy war’ (jihad) 
against the Sunni jihadists. The response 
was overwhelming: tens of thousands 
young Shiite men volunteered in the sub-
sequent days and weeks. 
Badr is only one of the many organiza-
tions that have been active for years or even 
decades and were able, in 2014, to acquire 
new recruits. Most members of the approxi-
mately 40 to 50 groups – and up to 100,000 
fighters – were Shiites. Even though addi-
tional militias were established around that 
time, the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl 
al-Haqq (League of Righteous), Kata’ib Hez-
bollah and Saraya al-Salam (Peace Com-
panies), all of which existed long before the 
founding of the PMF, dominated the new 
alliance. 
Among these four, the Badr Organization 
stands out because it is the closest ally of 
the Revolutionary Guards who have a pro-
found influence on the activities of the 
PMF. The militia alliance is nominally led 
by Kata’ib-Hezbollah commander Abu 
Mahdi al-Muhandis, also a close ally of Badr 
and the Revolutionary Guard. Hadi al-Amiri, 
however, is regarded as the real strong man 
behind Muhandis and appears in public as 
such. The third member of the PMF trium-
virate is Qasem Soleimani. 
Having control over the Interior Ministry 
and the police has allowed Badr to lead the 
PMF. The Iraqi government, under Prime 
Minister Haidar al-Abadi, is trying to bring 
the militias under state control; to this end, 
the People’s Mobilization Committee was 
set up in 2014 and chaired by National 
Security Advisor Falih al-Fayyad. But the 
committee was not able to assert itself 
against Amiri, Soleimani and Muhandis. 
The Interior Ministry, under Badr’s com-
mand, formally controls the militias which 
the government supports with money and 
weapons. Instead of establishing state con-
trol, the organization has access to enor-
mous finances which make it even more 
independent of the government. The im-
posing magnitude of its finances – the 
PMF’s budget was estimated at around one 
billion dollars in 2015 and 1.5 billion in 
2016 – is proof of Badr’s growing power. 
How little Badr cares about the wishes 
of its partners in Baghdad was shown in 
the offensive against the IS stronghold of 
Falluja in May 2016. The Shiite militia was 
not supposed to participate in the attack, 
under US pressure and a corresponding 
order from the government in Baghdad. 
However, during combat operations Badr’s 
leader Amiri announced that no one could 
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prevent the PMF from advancing on Falluja. 
Indeed, during the month of June, the 4th 
brigade of the Badr Organization took part 
in the fight and remained in the city after-
wards. 
The strength and independence of Badr’s 
units are particularly problematic because 
they were guilty of numerous crimes during 
and after military operations. Immediately 
after fighting with IS, these acts were often 
committed in revenge for the lives of Shiite 
militiamen who had become victims of the 
terrorist organization. However, even the 
slightest suspicion was usually sufficient 
to commit serious crimes against the local 
Sunni population. This included, for exam-
ple, the inhabitants of Tikrit, an IS strong-
hold. In March 2015, when government 
forces and the militia seized the town, 
thousands of Sunni civilians were executed, 
many of them at the hands of Badr forces. 
Moreover, the Badr Organization has re-
peatedly tried to prevent the return of flee-
ing Sunni Iraqis by destroying their houses 
and even entire villages. 
With the Revolutionary Guards 
in Syria 
The Badr Organization is heavily involved 
in the Syrian civil war. Under the leader-
ship of several hundred military advisors 
sent by the Revolutionary Guards and the 
Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi and Afghan mili-
tias have been fighting alongside Bashar 
al-Assad’s troops against Sunni insurgents 
since the winter of 2011/2012. No later than 
spring 2013, Badr sent an expeditionary 
force to Syria as well. 
The most important reason for the 
Iranian, Lebanese, Iraqi and Afghan support 
is the alliance between the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and the Assad regime which has 
been in place since 1980. However, the esca-
lating conflict between Shiites and Sunnis 
and the related internationalist mindset 
play a significant role, also. It is less about 
the Alawite minority in Syria, which most 
Shiites (rightly) regard as a heretic sect, ex-
trinsic to their denomination. Rather, the 
Badr Organization has engaged in the war 
to support Hezbollah who would hardly be 
able to maintain control in Lebanon with-
out Syrian supplies. Moreover, as Syrian 
government troops have had personnel 
problems since 2012, Iraqi support has 
become increasingly important. 
In the beginning, the Iraqi contingents 
that formed the core of the Shia militia 
presence in Syria together with Lebanese 
Hezbollah units were known as the Abu 
Fadl al-Abbas Brigade (Liwa Abu Fadl 
al-Abbas). At that time, most Iraqi fighters 
appear to have been sent by Asa’ib Ahl 
al-Haqq and Kata’ib Hezbollah. The most 
important motivation for their presence 
was to protect sacred Shiite sites and, in 
particular, the Sayyida Zainab Mosque in 
the south of Damascus. Zainab Bint Ali 
(625–682), the Prophet’s granddaughter 
and daughter of the first Shiite Imam, is 
believed to be buried in this shrine which 
has become increasingly popular among 
Shiite pilgrims since the 1980s. Many 
Shiites fear that Sunni terrorists could 
destroy the mosque. Indeed, in 2012, the 
majority of Shiite militiamen were de-
ployed to the area around the Sayyida 
Zainab Mosque, where primarily Shiites 
reside. However, the fighters extended 
their radius of influence further and be-
came active as far north as Aleppo. 
Until spring 2013, Shiite militias were 
officially trying to deemphasize their pres-
ence in Syria. The situation changed when 
the city of Qusair was retaken by the re-
gime in April and May, as thousands of 
Lebanese Hezbollah fighters were involved 
in the operation. Following this success, 
General Secretary Hasan Nasallah publicly 
acknowledged the presence of his organiza-
tion in Syria. Until then, the Badr Organi-
zation had denied sending units to the 
neighbouring country, but, starting in July, 
it followed Hezbollah’s lead and announced 
that it had stationed troops in Syria. As a 
consequence, the Forces of the Martyr Mu-
hammad Baqir al-Sadr (Quwwat al-Shahid 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr), Badr’s expedi-
tionary unit, began publishing pictures 
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and videos of their activities in Syria with 
increasing frequency. 
Badr units participated in numerous 
armed confrontations during the Syrian 
civil war. In 2013, they were mainly sta-
tioned in Damascus and fought in the 
Sayyida Zainab area. From the beginning of 
2014, Badr units were seen in the Qalamun 
Mountains north of Damascus near the 
Lebanese border, one of the major Hez-
bollah areas of operations. In March they 
participated in battles around the city of 
Yabrud. Their presence in this region is a 
clear indication of the particularly close 
cooperation between Badr and their Leba-
nese counterpart. 
An estimated 1,000 to 1,500 Badr fight-
ers are thought to have been deployed in 
Syria between 2013 and 2014, with an esti-
mated overall capacity of around 3,000 to 
5,000 Iraqi militiamen. In 2014, large num-
bers of Iraqi fighters, including militiamen 
of the Badr Organization, were relocated 
back to Iraq to fight against IS. In autumn 
2015, the number of Iraqi volunteers in 
Syria rose again since the Iranian leader-
ship wanted to support the visibly weakened 
Syrian army. There is ample evidence that 
the Badr Organization was fighting in Syria 
in 2016, also. Indeed, Badr strengthened its 
units further when the battle for Aleppo 
intensified during that same year. 
Rising tensions in Iraq and 
the region 
In Iraq, the Badr Organization is well on 
its way to establishing a state within a state 
that is dependent on Iran. Badr controls 
Diyala, a territory that could easily be ex-
panded into an independent power base. 
Since it controls the Interior Ministry, the 
organization is an important actor in Iraqi 
politics, also. 
This hampers Abadi’s efforts to integrate 
the militias into the country’s armed forces 
and, thereby, bring them under govern-
mental control. In February 2016, the gov-
ernment decreed that the PMF militia 
should become an independent part of the 
Iraqi armed forces while remaining under 
the authority of the Prime Minister as com-
mander-in-chief. On 26 November, the Iraqi 
Parliament passed a law supporting the 
official decree. There has been, however, no 
indication that these measures were suc-
cessful and actually limited their independ-
ence. It follows that Badr (and the other 
major militias) could prevent the stabiliza-
tion of the Iraqi state while dramatically 
influencing the country’s politics, also. 
Nevertheless, from October 2016 on-
wards, the government has had some suc-
cess in the offensive against Mosul. With US 
support, Abadi prevented Badr and its part-
ners from participating in the fight for the 
city and deployed the militias west of the 
Nainawa province, towards the Syrian bor-
der. This step was particularly important 
for the offensive’s long-term success. In-
deed, had Badr invaded the predominantly 
Sunni city of Mosul and committed its 
usual acts of revenge, resentment among 
the local population might have provoked 
serious conflicts in the future. The events 
of Falluja in May 2016 demonstrated, how-
ever, that Badr and its allies were still able 
to enter the city shortly after it had been 
seized. In addition, the militia operated in 
the west of Mosul and focused on the city 
of Tal Afar which they had not succeeded in 
taking by July 2017. In this sense, the risk 
that the militia’s attacks could inflame the 
local Sunni population against the central 
government is still acute. 
The prominence of the militias in general, 
and of the Badr Organization in particular, 
threatens to fuel the broader conflict be-
tween Sunnis and Shiites, also. In particular 
groups such as the Sunni IS and its prede-
cessors have been seeking, since 2003, con-
frontations with the Shiites and inflicted 
terrible acts of violence on them. However, 
Badr and the Shiite militia have also com-
mitted serious crimes aimed at driving out 
Sunni civilians from the areas in the north 
and the north-east of Baghdad. Moreover, 
Badr’s efforts are committed to securing the 
rule of Shiite Islamists in the whole of Iraq, 
to which also the Sunnis should submit. 
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Accordingly, they fuelled the conflict 
between the various religious and ethnic 
groups in the country. 
The militant quest for leadership is prob-
lematic beyond Iraq, too. The Badr Organi-
zation, which is already operating in Syria, 
has threatened to invade eastern Syria, if 
necessary, to fight IS there. Some policy 
observers read this development as part of 
an Iranian attempt to form a land bridge 
between the Shia territories in Iraq, west-
ern Syria and Lebanon. In any case, Badr 
fighters gained valuable military experi-
ence through the conflict against IS in Iraq 
and were able to establish new and even 
closer relations with other Shiite groups. 
Even though it is still unclear whether they 
will start operating outside Iraq and Syria, 
Sunni states are watching the gradual for-
mation of an international Shiite militia 
under Iranian leadership with a great deal 
of suspicion. The Badr Organization is a key 
player in the region’s political and military 
landscape and one of the main reasons for 
the escalation of regional tensions between 
the Iranian camp and its opponents. 
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